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Abstract
Mutual company in Japan is unique in its origin, historical de-
velopment, commanding presence, conceptual problem, demutu-
alization trend, etc. This paper will clarify its uniqueness by review-
ing a literature in connection with historical, comparative and theo-
retical studies on mutual company in Japan. Based on that this
paper will consider significance of the recent demutualization of
Dai―ichi Life and conclude that it will be a turning point in the
history of life insurance industry in Japan.
1. Introduction
Mutual companies in Japan are rather unique in that
they are only life insurance companies and that they have
dominated life insurance market for over 60 years. How
andwhymajor life insurancecompanieshavebeenalmost
exclusively mutual companies? How significant it is that
they are mutual companies? Do those companies really
function as mutual companies? Because of such questions,
the issue of mutual life insurance companies has been
one of the most important issues for over 40 years. The
issue has been even more widely and deeply discussed
because seven life insurance companies have gone bank-
ruptcy in 1990s and many of large life insurance compa-
nies in other countries have converted frommutual com-
panies to stock ownership.
Among numerous research papers and articles, there
has been no one sided or conclusive opinion as to supe-
riority and inferiority, pros and cons, and future course
of development of mutual companies. They are in line
with the situation where major life insurance companies
have remained to be mutual companies in spite of criti-
cism and downside of mutual companies. However there
has been very epoch―making development that TheDai―
ichi Life Insurance Company, Limited, which is the first
mutual company in Japan and one of the biggest life in-
surance companies, was changed to stock company in
April, 2010.
It is a very significant event in two aspects. Firstly it
is an interesting development from academic viewpoint.
That is to say, it will be a good subject of the case study
from the viewpoint of comparison between mutual com-
panies and stock companies now that you can compare
performance of large mutual and large stock companies
on equal footing. Secondly, there is a possibility that it
might dramatically change the life insurance industries
in Japan. Other large life insurance companies might fol-＊Associate Professor, Department of Commerce, Senshu University
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low the course of Dai―ichi or Dai―ichi might move to
merger and acquisition taking full advantage of now be-
ing the stock company.
This paper will address the issues of mutual life insur-
ancecompanies fromhistorical, comparativeandtheoreti-
cal view point and conclude that Dai―ichi’s conversion
to stock company is a very important development which
is worth of close monitoring and further studying.
2. Historical Review
（1）Dominance by Mutual Companies
Dai―ichi Life, which is the first mutual life insurance
company in Japan, was founded in 1902. At that time all
life insurance companies were stock companies, which
was the reason that Mr.Tsuneta Yano who was a medical
doctor employed by Nippon Life and the founder of the
Dai―ichi, made it a mutual company（Yano, 1936）. Since
then there were only a couple of mutual companies with
the majority being stock companies until the Second
World War（the war）. After the war, all those stock com-
panies restarted their enterprise as mutual companies1）.
While it might sound a little strange, the exact reason
why they have become mutual companies has not been
identified（Iwasaki, 1989, p.3 ; Tamura, 1989, p.76; Yone-
yama, 2001, pp.14―18）.
After the war, the life insurance industries in Japan
have accomplished remarkable growth and the compa-
nies which have dominated themarket have beenmutual
companies. In 2000, the proportion of mutual companies
was 85％ in terms of premium and 88.6％ in terms of
the amount of insurance in force even though the num-
ber ofmutual companies was only 11 among total 43 com-
panies excluding Kampo Life（see Table 1）. This is be-
cause all the traditional major companies were mutual
companies.
After 2000 four traditional mutual insurance companies
have demutualized because the Insurance Business Law
has been changed so as to make it possible in 2000. They
were Daido and Yamato in 2002, Taiyo in 2003 and Mit-
sui in 20042）. Now that the number of the traditional mu-
tual companies has been reduced to six and more impor-
tantly owing to the emergence of non―traditional type
companies, although the proportion of premium income
by the mutual companies is still 83％ of total traditional
companies（￥14,326,858 million out of ￥17,220,119
million）, the proportion by them of total life insurance
companies is 42％（￥14,326,858 million out of ¥34,063,
950 million）for 2008（see Table 2）.
Percentage of Mutual
Cos. by Premium
Number of Mutual
Companies
1980 95％ 16
1997 89％ 15
2000 85％ 11
2008 42％ 6
Source : Data of 1997 was obtained from Table 11 and other data was
obtained from Seimeihoken Tokei Go（Statistics of Life Insurance Busi-
ness in Japan）for respective years.
Mutual Companies Traditional Stock Companies
Nippon Life 5,035,543 Mitsui Life 743,487
Dai―ichi Life 2,903,640 Taiyo Life 596,456
Meiji―Yasuda Life 2,684,824 Daido Life 811,330
Sumitomo Life 2,529,256 T & D Financial 240,483
Asahi Life 527,095 Dai―ichi Frontier 366,428
Fukoku Life 646,500 Fukoku Shinrai 135,077
Total 14,326,858 Total 2,893,261
Source : Data was obtained from Seimeihoken Tokeigo Heisei 21―nen Ban.
（Statistics of Life Insurance Business in Japan 2008）
Table 1. Dominance by Mutual Companies
Table 2. Premium Income by Traditional Companies for 2008（Unit : Million yen）
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Type
Year
（A） （B） （C） （D）
Mutual Stock
1908 1 15
1950 16 4
1980 16 4 3
2000 11 1 15 13 3
2008 6 6 17 9 6
Source : The numbers were obtained from Nihon Seimeihoken Kyokai
Hyakunenshi（100―year History of Japan Life Insurance Association）
and Nissei―Kisoken REPORT.
Table 3. Number of Life Insurance Companies
by Year and Type
Life insurance companies in Japan are categorized into
four types of companies. They are traditional companies
（A）, companies owned by foreign owners（B）, compa-
nies owned by non―life insurance companies（C）and
companies owned by non―insurance companies（D）.
The number of life insurance companies and its distribu-
tion by the year and the type are as shown in Table 3.
In 1908, there were 35 life insurance companies includ-
ing ones under liquidation process and having stopped
business. The number shown here is the one of the com-
panies who were members of the Life Insurance Compa-
nies Association which was established in 1908.
The three foreign companies in 1980 were American Life
Insurance Company, American Family Life Assurance
Company of Columbus and Seibu Allstate Insurance
Company. The four traditional stock companies in 1980
were Heiwa, Taisho, Nihon―Dantai, Kyoei out of which
Heiwa merged with foreign company, Taisho and Kyoei
had gone bankruptcy. In 2001, Nihon―Dantai merged
with AXA Group making the number of traditional
stock company zero. Among six traditional stock com-
panies in 2008, three were T ＆ D Financial, Dai―ichi
Frontier and Fukoku Shinrai which were recently founded
by parent traditional companies respectively. Six cate-
gory（D）companies in 2008 are Sony, Orix, Airio,
Life―net, Midori and SBI―AXA. Life―net and SBI―AXA
were organized in 2006 with Airio and Midori having
been organized in 2007. Life―net is the company founded
independently without having any sponsor companies
for the first time in 74 years（Iwase, 2009, p.18）.
（2）Market Trend
After the war, life insurance industry in Japan has de-
veloped remarkably and who contributed to the growth
were traditional insurance companies, most of which
were mutual companies. During 30 to 40 years after the
war, there was a situation called “20 Companies System”
whichmeans therewere only 20 life insurance companies
with 16 companies being mutual companies, making the
very stable and fast growing market. For those mutual
companies, one of the most important products was long
term life insurance, thanks to which the life insurance
in Japan has become one of the largest in the world and
it was said that the average amount of premium for life
insurance was 450,000 yen per family（Iwase, 2009, p.
33）. It would be the second largest spending after house
expenses for Japanese household.
After 1990s, however, there has been a shift of consumer
taste from life insurance to medical and pension insurance.
One of the reasons for such movement is the change
of the society. Under the rapid economic growth after
the war, the life insurance has sold especially well as a
security for inadvertent loss of a bread earner in the fam-
ily. However, by the 1990s, the market of life insurance
had been pretty much saturated with over 90％ of all
households being insured. Furthermore the society has
been changing into so called “the era of lesser children
and more aged people” where the proportion of a single
and aged family has been dramatically increased. Those
are the people who are more concerned about their fu-
ture needs for medical and pension expenses than death
compensation for surviving family.
Such a social change is coincident with the rise of for-
eign insurance companies（type（B）companies）. Let’s
take a look at the Table 4, 5 and 6 which display the sig-
nificant increase of the premium share by the type（B）
companies from 10.1％（Table 4）to 17.7％（Table 5）
and to 25.9％（Table 6）. One reason is the growth of
medical and disease insurances which were the main
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products for two foreign companies, ALICO（American
Life Insurance Company）and Aflac（American Family
Assurance Company of Columbus）. Another is the entry
of foreign insurers as succeeding companies of the de-
funct traditional companies.
Both ALICO and Aflac are now among the top ten life
insurance companies in Japan. For instance, Aflac set
out their disease insurance in Japan in 1974. Their mar-
ket share in cancer insurance was 80％ at one time and
the number of individual policyholders exceeded the one
of Nippon Life for the first time in the history3）.
3. Comparative Review
In the US, many mutual life insurers have converted
into stock ownership in 1980s and 1990s. Especially to-
wards the end of 1990s and the beginning of 2000s, large
life insurance companies have demutualized resulting in
only one mutual company in the top ten life insurance
companies and three mutual companies in the top 20 life
insurance companies. It is due to the change of product
or service portfolio from life insurance to pension insur-
ance, from life insurance to financial services, and
deregulation of financial services due to the enactment
of Gramm―Leach Bliley Act（Tsuru, 2000, pp.91―92）.
In the UK, a majority of mutual life insurance compa-
nies have demutualized in 1990s and 2000s with only a
few small mutual companies remaining. Life insurance
companies in UK have developed mostly as long term
savings institutions and the competition with other insti-
tutions such as banks and home savings and loan insti-
tutions have been intensified owing to the deregulation
of financial services under the Financial Services and
Markets Act of 2000.
When they demutualized, they were sponsored by
home savings and loan institutions or banks with the
only exception of NorwichUnion which was independent
and changed to stock ownership for strategic reasons.
It is interesting that there was activism of policyholders,
so called carpet bagger behind demutualization of some
companies such as Friends Provident, Scottish Provi-
dent and Standard Life（Tsuru, 2000, pp.108―110）.
In Canada, life insurance companies have becomemu-
tual companies so as to prevent foreign interests from
merging and acquiring them in 1950s and 1960s. On the
contrary, however, they have again chosen to go back
to stock ownership under the movement towards finan-
cial conglomerate around 2000. Five mutual companies
including top four companies have converted into stock
companies as Shown in Table 9（Tsuru, 2000, p.98）.
In Australia, top 3 mutual life insurance companies
Number
Premium
（Trillion yen）
Increase
（％）
Share
（％）
（A） 12 22.03 △2.0 85.0
（B） 15 2.61 11.0 10.1
（C） 13 0.63 21.4 2.4
（D） 3 0.65 0.3 2.5
Total 43 25.92 △0.3 100
Source : Nissei―Kisoken REPORT September 2001
Number
Premium
（Trillion yen）
Increase
（％）
Share
（％）
（A） 12 17.25 1.3 63.1
（B） 17 7.07 △10.3 25.9
（C） 9 2.20 △2.5 8.1
（D） 6 0.80 3.6 2.9
Total 44 27.33 △2.2 100
Source : Nissei Kisoken Report September 2009
Number
Premium
（Trillion yen）
Increase
（％）
Share
（％）
（A） 11 19.70 △7.8 76.2
（B） 18 4.58 29.0 17.7
（C） 10 0.97 38.2 3.8
（D） 2 0.61 △5.4 2.4
Total 41 25.86 △1.6 100
Source : Nissei―Kisoken REPORT September 2003
Table 4. Proportion of Premium Income
by Company Type（2000）
Table 5. Proportion of Premium Income
by Company Type（2002）
Table 6. Proportion of Premium Income
by Company Type（2008）
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have been demutualized remaining only one mutual
company. They are National Mutual in 1995, Colonial
Mutual in 1997 and AMP in 1998. There has been only
one, relatively small mutual company named CUNA
Mutual in Australia. In South Africa, Sanlam and Old Mu-
tual, the two largest mutual life insurance companies,
were demutualized in 1998 and 1999 respectively. Swiss
Life, the biggest life insurance company founded in
1857 were demutualized in 1997（Birkmaier and Laster,
1999, p.4）.
In Germany and France, there has been no such trend
for demutualization, because mutual companies in both
countries are relatively small and mostly a part of busi-
ness group having strong ties peculiar to mutual commu-
nity（Tsuru, 2000, p.99）.
While the exact reasons for demutualization may dif-
fer according to various companies, they are basically
categorized into two groups. One is defensive reason to
cope up with financial or managerial difficulty4）and an-
other is offensive reason to gain competitive strength
or to improve corporate governance（Mizushima, 2001,
pp.5―6 ; Tsuru, 2000, p.94 ; Ono, pp.97―99）. Please see
the reason column（shown as “R” or “Reasen”）in the
Table 7 through 9. In the UK（Table 8）, Scottish Provi-
dent, Friends Provident and Standard Life have demutu-
alized as a result of the carpet baggers activity.
Name of Company Year R
UNUM 1986 O
Northwestern National 1989 D
Maccabees 1989 D
Equitable Life 1992 D
Midland Mutual Life 1994 D
State Mutual 1995 O
Guarantee Life 1995 O
MONY 1998 O
Standard Insurance Co． 1999 O
John Hancock 2000 O
Metropolitan（Metlife） 2000 O
Phoenix Home Life 2001 O
Prudential 2001 O
Principal 2001 O
Source : Tsuru, 2000, p.92, reason column, etc. added by
the author
Name of Company Year R
FS Assurance 1989 D
Pioneer Mutual 1990 D
Scottish Mutual 1991 D
Scottish Equitable 1993 D
Provident Mutual 1995 D
Clerical Medical 1996 D
Norwich Union 1997 O
Scottish Amicable 1997 D
NPI 1998 D
Scottish Widows 1999 D
Scottish Life 2000 D
Scottish Provident 2000 D
Friends Provident 2001 D
Standard Life 2006 D
Source : Tsuru, 2000, p.93, reason column, etc. added by
the author
Mutualization Demutualization Reason
Clarica Mutual 1999 Offensive
Manulife 1968 1999 Offensive
Canada Life 1962 1999 Offensive
Industrial 1969 2000 Offensive
Sun Life 1962 2000 Offensive
Source : Tsuru, 2000, p.98, reason column etc. added by the author
Table 7. Demutualization in US Table 8. Demutualization in UK
Table 9. Demutualization in Canada
49Mutual Company in Japan, its uniqueness and future development
4. Theoretical Review
（1）Gap between Concept and Actuality
As mutual companies have grown into large compa-
nies, it has invoked very strong interest and questions
among many scholars as to what is mutual company and
what type of company it should be and how it will de-
velop in the future（Mizushima, 2001, p.6）. This is be-
cause the gap has been generated between the concept
of mutual company and its operation in the real world
as unavoidable result of historical developments（Mi-
zushima, 1989, p.31）.
The concept of mutual company consists of mutual
sharing of expenses and self―governance by policyhold-
ers（Mizushima, 2001, p.7）. In other words, mutualism
means nonprofit enterprise as well as mutual assistance
among policyholders（Yoneyama, 2001, p.9）. The advan-
tage of mutual company is to be able to avoid conflict
of interest between policyholder and stockholder and
also to be able to overcome uncertainty pertaining to long
term insurance contract（Chano, 2001 ; Iguchi, 2000）.
Mutualism was not so conspicuous or it was not so
considered as characteristics peculiar tomutual company
before the war as it was so regarded after the war（Mi-
zushima, 2001, p.21 ; Yoneyama, 2001）. That is to say,
large mutual companies after the war have fully taken
advantage of it as their raison d’etre, because one of the
most important products for them was the long term life
insurance. While there seems to be general consensus
that mutual companies in the actuality are not in line
with the concept ofmutual company, there are someopin-
ions that support mutualism as a backbone of the present
mutual companies.
Some of the views are as follows. What is really neces-
sary for mutual company is to shift the paradigm of man-
agement so as to make policyholder interest first prior-
ity, for instance to return hidden assets to policyholder
（Mizushima, 2001, p.14）. Mutual company at present
lacks attitude to abide by real “sharing expenses” pol-
icy（Mizushima, 2001, p.15）. Even stock company pur-
sues customer satisfaction, then what is mutual company’s
customer satisfaction（Mizushima, 2001, p.22）？ Mutual
company is the method to protect policyholder interest
in view of the nature and long term contract of insurance
（Iguchi, 2000, p.13）.
（2）Corporate Governance
Discussions and study on corporate governance in
mutual companies has started in 1960s, which is much
earlier than corporate governance in general has become
one of the most important issues in the wide range of
social science both in Japan and other countries in 1990s.
This is because corporate governance is indispensible
element of mutualism as stated above. It goes without
saying that governance by policyholders cannot be eas-
ily done inmutual companies if the number of policyhold-
ers goes up to 10 million to 14 million in case of large
companies and 1 million to 3 million in case of medium
companies. Even though they have invented the system
of the representatives meeting, it does not function as
expected because representatives are chosen by com-
pany and many policyholders are not conscious of their
right and duty as important stakeholder being equivalent
to stockholder.
Under the circumstances, it is not realistic to regard
governance by policyholders as essential ingredient of
mutualismormutual company and to characterizemutual
company as nonprofit enterprise（Maeda, 1995, p.122,
p.127）. It is the limitation on governance by policyhold-
ers（Mizushima, 2001, p.14）and representatives meet-
ing does not function as expected to make governance
effective（Iwasaki, 1989, p.5 ; Takao, 1999, p.38）.
In 1990s, seven life insurance companies have gone
bankruptcy. One of the reasons for their failure is ineffec-
tive corporate governance. Among seven companies, there
were both mutual companies and stock companies5）.
Thus you can not attribute it solely to mutual ownership.
In Japan, there was no effective corporate governance
by stockholders due to absence of separation of execu-
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tion and supervision. Therefore, so far as corporate gov-
ernance in the past 50 yeas is concerned, there should
have been no difference between mutual company and
stock company.
Theoretically speaking, even though there is equally
ineffective control over the manager, stock form is bet-
ter than mutual form, because the interests of manager
and shareholdermight be concomitant as to conservation
of wealth and growth of the company while the interests
of manager and policyholder aremostly adverse on those
matters（Hetherington, 1969, pp.1102―1103）. Anyway,
as a matter of fact, there have been so many regulatory
reforms introduced in Japan to strengthen corporate gov-
ernance since 1990s.Hence, if they are serious to improve
corporate governance, there is no question that stock
company is more advantageous than mutual company.
（3）Reason for Demutualization
According to what Japanese life and nonlife insurance
industries have put together, there are four reasons for
demutualization. They are to improve access to capital
market, to have free hands on business developments,
to avoid bankruptcy（raised by only life insurance com-
panies）and to serve for national economy（Tsuru, 2000,
p.99）.
In the US, dozens of mutual companies have demutu-
alized since 1900s, for which an important incentive was
access to capital market so as to facilitate an acquisition,
etc. andmutual companies are no less efficient than stock
companies according to empirical study of 33 life insur-
ers before and after demutualization（McNamara and
Rhee, 1992, p.223, pp.235―236）. McNamara and Rhee
（1992）has also found that after demutualization the
weight of nonparticipating insurance has increased,
which is consistent with the Daido’s case in Japan.
Likewise, as a result of the empirical study of 41 com-
panies from 1966 through 1984, Boose（1990）concluded
that there is no systematic difference but a strong signifi-
cant difference of regulatory regimes between mutual
and stock companies. Thus it appears that there is no
strong evidence that either form of company is more ad-
vantageous than other form as a result of empirical study
in the US.
（4）Diversified View
There are many different views as to the issue of mu-
tual versus stock ownership of life insurance companies
in Japan. The followings are some of them.
While there is some notable tendency that more and
more life insurance companies in overseas countries
are demutualized recently, I do not see so much sig-
nificance in demutualization of Japanese companies
（Iguchi, 2002, p.2）.
It is not reasonable that youmake comparison between
mutual companies and stock companies just fromview-
point of efficiency（Chano, 2002）.
It is not very significant to make unilateral comparison
between them（Okamura, 2006, p.226）.
As a result of empirical study in the US, there has been
no clear conclusion that either is more efficient than
other（Chano, 2002）.
There is no evidence that it is a historical certainty that
the number of mutual companies will be decreased
（Tanaka, 2002, p.38）.
Whether it is mutual company or stock company is
a matter of strategic decision making by management
（Yoneyama, 2003）.
It is not always true that trend for demutualization is
universe. There are many mutual companies in the
world who are well run, respected by customers and
competitors alike（Birkmaier and Laster, 1999, p.34）.
Modern nature of mutual company is to prioritize poli-
cyholder interest under complete control by manager
because expense sharing policy and self―governance
by policyholders are no more part of mutualism in the
presentmutual company in Japan. Thereforewhat does
really matter ismanager’s ethics and strong leadership
to serve for such purposes（Mizushima, 1992, pp.16―
17 ; Mizushima, 2001, p.14）.
Because the interests of manager and policyholder
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do not necessarily coincide, it is up to regulatory de-
velopment whether mutual company will really pursue
policyholder’s interest（Hetherington, 1969, pp.1102―
1103）. In Japan, on the contrary, what actually
precluded mutual companies from achieving policy-
holder’s interest in 1980s was government policy to
protect the industry as a whole（Mizushima, 2001,
pp.10―13）.
As for corporate governance ofmutual company, Japan
might be ahead than UK in that some measures are
incorporated to make its governance system compara-
ble to stock company and that the procedures of coun-
cil meeting and policyholders meeting have been built
in the system（Hisamatsu, 2006, p.70）.
Based on the empirical study to find out any difference
in risk taking behavior between mutual versus stock,
and “keiretsu” affiliation versus non―keiretsu life insur-
ers in Japan, Yanase et al.（2008）has concluded that
mutual and keiretsu companies have less risk taking
attitudes than stock and non―keiretsu companies
respectively. In connection with this study, Kofuji
（2010）proposes another interpretation to the effect
that it is due to the scale of company rather than com-
pany form and affiliation reasons because mutual and
keiretsu companies are far larger than stock and
non―keiretsu companies.
5. Impact of Demutualization of Dai―ichi Life
In April 1, 2010, Daiichi Life, the oldest mutual com-
pany and the second largest life insurance company in
Japan has demutualized. This is the largest IPO in the
history of the Tokyo stock exchange. The number of
stocks issued is 10 million. The total value of them is
1.4 trillion yen. This is the largest stock company in Ja-
pan in terms of number of the shareholders. There are
8.21 million policyholders out of which 7.38 million is
entitled to receive their share of the assets either by
stock or cash with the remaining 0.83 million receiving
no share. Some 1.2 million to 1.3 million policyholders
were to choose receiving stocks in the amount of 40
billion yen and 6 million would receive cash in the total
amount of 1 trillion yen. The number of the shareholders
has turned out to be 1.37million.
The offered price of IPO was ¥140,000 and first mar-
ket price was ¥160,000. As of April 30, the price was
¥160,500 with only five days when the price was below
¥160,000 in the first 20 days（Nihon Keizai Shimbun,
May 1, 2010）. The price has never gone down below
¥140,000 which might be some evidence of the demutu-
alization being well received in the stock market.
Whether or not there was expropriation or change of
wealth is a subject of future study6）.
It is rare that the mutual company having over 8 mil-
lion policyholders is converted into a stock company not
just in Japan but also in the world7）. For instance, the
number of policyholders was 2.3 million in case of Stan-
dard Life, over 2 million in case of Friends Provident,
750,000 in case of Scottish Provident and 600,000 in case
of Equitable in U.K.（Tsuru, 2000, pp.108―112）. When
Daido, Taiyo, andMitsui were demutualized, the number
of policyholders was 930,000, 3.82 million and 2.62 mil-
lion respectively（Shukan Kinyu Zaisei Jijo, April 7,
2008, p.13）.
This is an epoch―making event in the history of life
insurance industry in Japan on the following points :
If the demutualization of Daiichi will turn out to be
successful, other mutual companies may follow the
path of Daiichi. Right now, Nippon is sure that they
willcontinuetobeamutualcompanywhileMeijiYasuda
and Sumitomo are closelymonitoring the development
and studying the issues.
In the past, 4 largest life insurance companies were
all mutual companies. So we could not comparemutual
companies and stock companies on equal footing. Now
thatwe canmake sucha comparison,wewill havesome
more bases to form our opinions one way or another
in connection with some important issues as follows.
Let’s think about some hypotheses :
（A）Mutual companies will produce more value to
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policyholders than stock companies.
（B）Stock companies will have more effective corpo-
rate governance than mutual companies.
（C）In view of the recent and future developments
of life insurance businesses in Japan, stock companies
are becoming more suitable than mutual companies.
（D）Stock companies will have more advantage in
developing businesses byM＆Aetc. in overseas coun-
tries than mutual companies.
（E）Whether it is a mutual company or a stock com-
pany does not make any big difference as long as
（A）,（B）,（C）, or（D）are concerned respectively.
By studying and comparing performance of Daiichi and
other mutual companies, we will be in a position to bet-
ter answer those questions or prove such hypotheses.
6. Conclusion
In conclusion, the uniqueness of mutual companies in
Japan, its implications and future development are sum-
marized as follows :
（1）Only Life Insurance Company
While this paper did not directly deal with the issue,
one of the first uniqueness is that there are no mutual
companies other than life insurance companies in Japan.
There used to be two non―life mutual insurance compa-
nies in the past. However, one was demutualized and
another had gone bankruptcy8）. Furthermore, those life
insurance companies are all large companies which are
not necessarily appropriate for mutual form9）. Based on
its origin, concept and purposes, mutual company should
better serve as a vehicle to insure certain types of risks
for which commercial insurance is not readily available
in the market. For instance, in the US, over the past dec-
ades, a substantial proportion of new property and casu-
alty companies have been either mutual companies or
risk retention groups（Birkmaier and Laster, 1999, p.19）.
One example is Medmarc which began as a group cap-
tive company in 1970s and now a mutual company for
manufacturers of medical devices who could not buy
product liability insurance for a reasonable price. In Ja-
pan, there are no such mutual companies.
（2）Reason for Mutual Company
What is even more unique is that there have been no
reasons identified as to why over ten life insurance com-
panies have become mutual companies after the war.
There are some opinions that it might have been any in-
fluence of GHQ（SJK, 1990, p.205）, intent to spread own-
ership among many individuals（Birkmaier and Laster,
1999, p.19）or convenience to raise the capital（Okamura,
200, p.225 ; Yoneyama, 2001, p.18）. However there has
been no strong evidence to support any of such opinions
（Yoneyama, 2001, pp.14―18）. Although characteristics
of mutual companies vary by countries, there is no such
country as you can not explain why so many companies
have converted to mutual companies at the same time.
In Japan, it happened to be mutual companies who have
made life insurance so large. However you can not say
if it were stock companies, there would have been no
such success.
（3）Dominance in the Market
Judging superficially from only the decrease of mutual
companies, and reduction of mutual companies’ market
share from 95％ in 1980 to 42％ in 2008 as shown in
Table1, you may have the impression that there has been
some tendency to demutualization even in Japan. How-
ever the increase of stock companies is due to new en-
try of foreign companies and establishment of subsidiary
companies by non―life insurers which took place after
1996. With regards to the traditional companies, there
United States Japan
United
Kingdom
Germany France
33％ 3％ 8％ 16％ 37％
Source : Birkmaier and Laster, 1999, p.6.
Table 10. Market Share of Property and Casualty Mutual
Company（1997）
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have been only four stock companies converted from
mutual companies. Furthermore, five mutual companies
had gone bankruptcy between 1997 and 2001, which also
caused decrease of the number of mutual companies.
Until 2010, the top four life insurance companies have
been mutual companies and their substantial market
presence was a unique feature of life insurance in Japan
（Table 11）.
（4）Gap between Concept and Actuality
This issue has evoked so much interest and research
questions among many scholars for over 40 years10）. The
discussions have gone over wide range from agency the-
ory to legal theory11）. The only area with less intensive
study has been empirical research, which is due to the
fact that the market has been so homogenized domesti-
cally and so unique internationally. That is to say, we
have had no stock companies comparable to dominant
mutual companies and there have been difficulty tomake
comparison with overseas companies because of such
fundamental difference as market composition, history,
economy and society etc. As a matter of fact, all non―tra-
ditional companies（Type（B）,（C）,（D））are stock companies,
which might suggest that mutual form may not be very
much compatible to modern needs of life insurance.
Hence even such innovative company as Life―net selling
life insurance with half price of traditional companies
has adopted stock form.
（5）Too Large to Demutualize
This is in a sense analogous to the issue（3）above.
Because mutual companies in Japan are so large, it is
not so easy to be demutualized as many companies in
other countries12）. The number of policyholders is over
10 million in case of top four companies. The process
of demutualization is cumbersome taking a lot of time
and expenses and also it is challenging to appropriately
conduct administration of so many stockholders. While
those mutual companies may emphasize superiority of
mutual form to justify their decision to remain mutual,
it is a big issue as a matter of practice whether or not
any pros of demutualization overweigh its cons of time
and expenses. That seems to be a reason that other mu-
tual companies are careful and prudent on the matter.
（6）Before and After
In order to foresee any change and impact as a result
of Dai―ichi demutualization, it might be worthwhile to
look at distribution of premium income between mutual
and stock companies among the traditional companies
before and after the demutualization. See the accompa-
nying Table 13. It is evident that presence of mutual com-
panies within traditional companies was still very large
in 2009 but that it will be notably diminished after 2010.
Although proportion of premium by the mutual compa-
nies will be somewhere 66％ of the traditional compa-
nies, if you take into consideration growing presence
of non―traditional companies, the mutual’s proportion
of all the life insurance companies will be 34％（¥11,423,218
US Japan UK Germany France
Number of Mutuals 100 15 47 53 17
Market Share 35％ 89％ 33％ 26％ 5％
Source : Birkmaier and Laster, 1999, p.18
Business Governance
Conceptual Mutual Company Mutual Insurance Governance by Policyholders
Actual Mutual Company Profit Insurance Control by Managers
Table 11. Market Share of Life/health Mutual Companies（1997）
Table 12. Gap between Concept and Actuality
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million out of ¥34,063,950 million）. If you look back 1997
which was one year after the drastic reform of the insur-
ance system in Japan and look forward coming year, you
can tell what significant change the industry has been
going through partly due to Dai―ichi demutualization.
（7）Future Development
As for future development, Mr.Okamoto, president
of Nippon Life has mentioned in response to questions
on demutualization of Dai―ichi, that Nippon will not be
a stock company taking example of New York life which
is the only mutual company among top ten life insurance
companies in the US and has been elected as one of the
most respected insurance companies in the US（Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, March 25, 2010）. There is a possibility
that Nippon might only be a few remaining mutual com-
panies in Japan as New York life in the US, because
Meiji Yasuda and Sumitomo do not rule out possibility
of their becoming stock company.
Mutual companies in Japanaremore likeAnglo―Ameri-
can life insurance companies than smaller life insurance
companies in France and Germany. There has been no
more such situation asmutual companieshadbeen raised
during the past 60 years or mutual form is more suitable
than stock form in Japan. That is substantiated by the
fact that new life insurance companies other than tradi-
tional companies are all stock companies. Large mutual
companies are now competingwithworld class insurance
companies. For these reasons, it is likely that other mu-
tual companies will be stock companies some day in the
future. Birkmaier and Laster（1999, p.3）note : “The
mutuals that remain will have to decide―and keep decid-
ing―whether to convert to stock ownership.”
If you just look back the era of “20Companies System”,
you can tell a big difference now and then. The insurance
industry has been changed so as to have four different
types of companies. If large mutual companies and stock
companies compete trying to create more shareholder’s
and policyholder’s value, it will eventually serve for poli-
cyholder’s and shareholder’s interest. In that sense, the
diversification of life insurers should ultimately bring about
some benefit to consumers.
From now on, the emerging battle field for large insur-
ance companies in Japan will be overseas market. Talk-
ing about world class life insurers, MetLife Inc. acquired
insurance companies in Chili and Brazil in 2001, bought
the life and pension insurance division from City group
for＄11.5 billion in 2005 subsequent to its demutualiza-
tion in 2000 and now they have bought ALICO from AIG
group for ＄15.5 billion in 201013）. Thanks to its aggres-
sive M＆A strategy, the stock price of Met Life has more
than doubled in five years through 2007（Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, December 19, 2007）.
On the other hand, Dai―ichi raises more than 90％
of their profit from domestic businesses, since they are
only a minor shareholder of insurance companies in In-
dia, Taiwan and Australia at present（Dow Jones, March
31, 2010）. Then, what is in question is whether Dai―ichi
will be able to successfully expand in overseas countries
in the near future. It can be said that the demutualization
Mutual Stock
Before（2009） Number 6 6
Premium 83（42）％ 17（58）％
After（Estimate of 2010） Number 5 7
Premium 66（34）％ 34（66）％
Source : Data was obtained from Seimeihoken Tokeigo Heisei
21―nen Ban（Statistics of Life Insurance Business in Japan 2008）.
Notes : The figures in the parenthesis show the proportion out of all life insurance com-
panies including（A）,（B）,（C）and（D）.
Table 13. Proportion of Premium Before and After
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of Dai―ichi will have some effects upon overseas market.
This is the paper presented at theWorld Risk＆ Insur-
ance Economics Congress held in Singapore during July
25 through 29, 2010.
Notes
1）From May, 1947 through February, 1948, 13 stock insurers
have established their second companies as mutual company.
Dai―ichi, Chiyoda, Fukoku have continued to be mutual com-
pany by adding the fund（Yoneyama, 2001, pp.16―17）.
2）Before them, there was demutualization ofChiyoda andKyoei
in 2001. But it was a demutualization for liquidation of both
companies who had gone bankruptcy.
3）As of the end of September 2004, the number of insurance
in force in the area of individual insurance was 16,920,000 in
case of Aflac, whereas the number of Nippon Life was
16,580,000（Nihon Keizai Shimbun, December 3, 2004）.
4）One example of the defensive reason is “sponsored demutu-
alization” which means demutualization to receive capital as-
sistance from a sponsor（a company merging and acquiring
the mutual company）.
5）Nissan, Toho, Daihyaku, Chiyoda, and Tokyo were mutual
companies with Taisho and Kyoei being stock companies.
6）There is a great amount of literature on pricing of IPOs which
shows some evidence of prevalent underpricing（Viswanathan,
2006, p.442）.
7） The only exceptions were Metropolitan and Prudential, as for
both of which, the number of policyholders was 11 million.
8）One is The Daiichi Mutual Fire and Marine Insurance Com-
pany which was founded in 1949 and went bankruptcy in
2000. Another is Kyoei Mutual Fire and Marine Insurance
Company which had become mutual company in 1946 and
went back to stock ownership in 2003.
9）When firms are organized as consumer cooperatives, there
are two basic conditions with one being that there is relatively
severe market failure and another being that consumers are
able to control it without incurring excessive cost（Hansmann,
1985, p.126）.
10）In the US, prominence of mutual companies in the insurance
industry is one of the most interesting and least understood
problems for the student of industrial organization, since
mutuals account for almost half of all life insurance in force
and one quarter of all property and liability insurance（Hans-
mann, 1985, p.125）.
11）The seminal paper on agency theory is Jensen, M. C. and
W. H. Meckling（1976）and the pioneers who applied the
agency theory to insurance industry are David Mayers and
CliffordW. Smith（Birkmaier and Laster, 1999, p.7）. In Japan,
legal study on mutual insurers derived from a study on Ger-
man Law since the model of Dai―ichi was the Germanmutual
company and Insurance Business Law in Japan was made
with reference to the German Law（Yamashita, 1988）.
12）In the UK, three quarters of all demutualized life insurers
had policyholders less than 500,000（Hisamatsu, 2006, pp.
56―57）.
13）AIG Group had reached agreement with Prudential P.L.C. to
sell AIA Group Ltd. for＄35.5 billion in February, 2010. This
deal was terminated in June 2010, because Prudential was
not able toobtain the shareholders’ agreement to thepurchase
（Business Insurance, June 7, 2010）.
References
Birkmaier, U. and D, Laster（1999）“Are mutual insurers an en-
dangered species?” sigma , No.4, Swiss Re.
Boose, M. A.（1990）“Agency Theory and Alternative Predictions
for Life Insurers : An Empirical Test,” The Journal of Risk
and Insurance, Vol.57, No.3, pp. 499―518.
Chano, T.（2001）“The Perspective of the Corporate Governance
in the Japanese Life Insurance Companies,” JILI Journal ,
No.136, pp.129―188.
Coase R. H.（1960）“The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law
and Economy, Vol. 1, pp.1―44.
Demsetz H.（1964）“The Exchange and Enforcement of Property
Rights,” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 3, pp.11―26.
Demsetz H. and K. Lehn（1985）“The Structure of Corporate
Ownership : Causes and Consequences,” Journal of Political
Economy, Vol.93, pp.1155―1177.
Fama E. F.（1980）“Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm,”
Journal of Political Economy, Vol.88, pp.288―307.
Fama E. F. and M.C. Jensen（1983a）“Separation of Ownership
56
and Control,” The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.26, pp.
301―325.
Fama E. F. and M.C. Jensen（1983b）“Agency Problems and Re-
sidual Claims,” The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.26,
pp.327―349.
GilsonR.（1996）“CorporateGovernanceandEconomicEfficiency:
When Do Institutions Matter?” Washington University Law
Quarterly, Vol. 74, pp.327―345.
Gilson R.（1998）“Reflections in a Distant Mirror : Japanese Cor-
porate Governance through American Eyes?” Columbia Busi-
ness Law Review , Vol.1998, No.1, pp.203―221.
Green M.R. and R. F. Johnson（1980）“Stocks versus Mutuals :
Who Controls?” Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol.47, pp.165―
174.
Hansmann,H.（1985）“TheOrganizationof InsuranceCompanies:
Mutual versus Stock,” Journal of Law, Economics, andOrgani-
zation, Vol.1, No.1, pp.125―153.
Hetherington J. A. C.（1969）“Fact v. Fiction : Who owns Mutual
Insurance Companies?” Wisconsin Law Review, Vol.4, pp.
1068―1103.
Hisamatsu, T.（2006）“Trends of Corporate Governance of The
U.K. Mutual Life Insurance Companies,” Journal of Life Insur-
ance Management（Seimeihoken Keiei ）, Vol. 74, No.5, pp.
55―72.
Iguchi, T.（2000）“Mutual Life Insurance Company and its Corpo-
rate Governance,” Bunken Journal , No.133, pp.1―22.
Iwasaki, R.（1989）“Introduction to Panel―discussion on the Prob-
lems of the Mutual Insurance company,“Journal of Insurance
Science, No.527, pp.1―6.
Iwase, D.（2009）Seimeihoken No Karakuri, Bungei Shunju.
Jeng, V., G. C. Lai and M. J. McNamara（2007）“Efficiency and
Demutualization : Evidence From the U. S. Life Insurance
Industry in the 1980s and 1990s,” The Journal of Risk and In-
surance, Vol.74, No.3, pp. 683―711.
JensenM. C.（1993）“TheModern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and
the Failure of Internal Control System,” Journal of Finance ,
Vol.48, pp.831―880.
Jensen M. C. and W. H. Meckling（1976）“Theory of the Firm :
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,”
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.3, pp.305―360.
Kofuji, Y.（2010）“Organizational Structure and Risk Taking of
Life Insurance Industry in Japan : On the Another Interpre-
tation of Yanase, Asai, and Lai（2008）,” Senshu Business Re-
view , Vol.5, No.1, pp.1―8.
Lai, G. C., M. J. McNamara and T. Yu（2008）“The Wealth Effect
of Demutualization : Evidence From the U.S. Property―Liabil-
ity and Life Insurance Industries,” The Journal of Risk and
Insurance, Vol.75, No.1, pp.125―144.
Lamm―Tennant J. and L. T. Starks（1993）“Stock versus Mutual
Ownership Structures : The Risk Implications,” The Journal
of Business, Vol.66, pp.29―46.
Maeda, M.（1995）“Reason for Existence of Mutual Insurance
Companies and Fundamental Attributes thereof,” Bunken
Journal , No.111, pp.118―131.
Mayers D. and C. W. Smith（1986）“Ownership Structure and
Control : The Mutualisation of Stock Life Insurance Compa-
nies,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.16, pp.73―98.
Mayers D. and C. W. Smith（1988）“Ownership Structure across
Lines of Property―Casualty Insurance,” The Journal of Law
and Economics, Vol.31, pp.351―378.
Mayers D. and C. W. Smith（1992）“Executive Compensation in
the Life Insurance Industry,” The Journal of Business, Vol. 65,
pp.51―74.
Mayers D., A. Shivdasani and C. W. Smith（1997）“Board Com-
position andCorporate Control : Evidence from the Insurance
Industry,” The Journal of Business, Vol. 70, pp.33―62.
McNamara, M.J. and S. G. Rhee（1992）“Ownership Structure
and Performance : The Demutualization of Life Insurers,”
The Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol.59, No.2, pp.221―238.
Mizushima, K.（1989）“A Critical Observation on the Character
of Mutual Company,” Journal of Insurance Science , No.527,
pp.27―42.
Mizushima, K.（1992）“Historical Change of the Mutualism in the
Insurance System,” The Kokumin―Keizai Zassi(Journal of Eco-
nomics & Business Administration）, Vol.165, No.5, pp.1―18.
Mizushima, K.（2001）“Does the idea of mutualism draw to an
end?” Bunken Journal No.134―1, pp.5―23.
Okamura, K.（2006）“Seimeihoken―Sogokaisha niokeru Shinkateki
Corporate Governance nitsuite（Progressive Corporate Gov-
ernance in Mutual Life Insurance Company）,”Hoken―Shinka
to Hoken―Jigyo(Insurance Progress and Insurance Enterprise）,
Keio―Gijuku Shuppankai, pp.197―232.
Ono, R.（2004）“Demutualization of Life Insurance Companies in
the United States,” JILI Journal , No.149, pp.89―159.
Seimeihoken Shin Jitsumu Koza Henshuiinkai and Seimeihoken
Bunka Kenkyujo（SJK）（1990）Seimeihoken Shin Jitsumu
57Mutual Company in Japan, its uniqueness and future development
Koza（Life Insurance New Practical Course）Vol. 1, Yuhikaku.
Smith, C. W.（1986）“On the Convergence of Insurance and Finance
Research,” The Journal of Risk and Insurance , Vol. 53, No.4,
pp.693―717.
Takao, A.（1999）“Modern issues in Japanese mutual companies :
In pursuit of desirable corporate governance and accountabil-
ity,” Business Insight Summer , pp.34―43.
Tamura, Y.（1989）“Comparative Study on Corporate Governance
between Stock Company and Mutual Company, U. S. and Ja-
pan,” Journal of Insurance Science , No.527, pp.75―104.
Tsuru, N.（2000）“The Trend for Demutualization of Mutual Life
Insurance Companies,” Journal of Insurance Science, No.571,
pp.90―118.
Viswanathan, K. S.（2006）“The Pricing of Insurer Demutualiza-
tion Initial Public Offerings,” The Journal of Risk and Insur-
ance, Vol.73, No.3, pp.439―468.
Yamashita, T.（1988）Sogokaishaho no Gendaitekikadai（Modern
Issues of Mutual Companies）, Yano Tsuneta Kinenkai.
Yanase, N., Y. Asai andG.C. Lai（2008）“Organizational Structure
and Risk Taking : Evidence from the Life Insurance Industry
in Japan,” unpublished paper.
Yano, T.（1936）Ichigenshu, Kokuseisha.
Yoneyama, T.（2001）“Mutual Company and itsHistorical Lessons:
The Divide on the Form of Enterprise,” Journal of Insurance
Science, No.572, pp.5―22.
Yoneyama, T.（2003）“Corporate Governance at Japanese Life In-
surance Companies,” Life Insurance Management（Seimei-
hoken Keiei）, Vol. 71, No.1, pp.3―21.
58
